Filed03/24/15 Page1 of 47 Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 1 DEREK RUSSELL 735 Pine Street Santa Rosa, California [95404] 337-422-9200 In Pro Per 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORN 10 11 Derek Russell 12 Plaintiff, NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF ACTION 13 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. SECTION 1441(b) VS. 14 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, Complaint Filed: March 24, 2015 15 COUNTY OF SONOMA Hearing: March 26, 2015 16 Defendant. 17 18 19 20 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 21 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT Plaintiff Derek Russell hereinafter Russell hereby 22 removes to this Court the state court action described below, pursuant to 28, USC SECTION 23 1441(B). 24 1331 25 1. On February 18, 2015 an action was commenced in the Superior Court of the State of 26 California for the County of Sonoma, entitled PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 27 CALIFORNIA v Derek Russell, Individual. 28 2. CASE NOS: CHP84976TQ and SRO 1418580 REMOVAL OF ACTION 1

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page2 of 47

This action is a civil action of which this Court has original jurisdiction under 28
USC 1331 and is one which may be removed to this Court be Plaintiff herein
pursuant to the provisions of 28 USC 1441 ET SEQ.

4. This notice of removal is timely.

5. As required by 28 USC 1441 TRUE AND CORRECT COPIES OF PLEADINGS SERVED UPON Russell are being filed with this Notice of Removal, attached hereto as Exhibit A.

6. Removal of this action is proper under 28 USC 1441 because it is a civil action brought in a state court and the federal district court have original jurisdiction of the subject matter pursuant to 28, USC 1441 because the causes of action are plead under federal statutes.

7. Therefore pursuant to these statutes and in confornmeance with the requirements set forth in 28 USC 1441, Russell hereby removes this action from the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Sonoma to the Northern District.

DATE: March 24, 2015

Derek Russell

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Superior Court of California, County of Sonoma

Traffic Division - Room 109-J

600 Administration Drive Santa Rosa, CA 95403-2878

TRAFFIC COURT MINUTES

Courtroom:

14

Date: 3/20/2015

Time:

10:30

Judicial Officer: WHEELDIN, ANTHONY

Interpreter:

Clerk:

Pat Graham

Language:

Case Information

Case #: SRO1418580

Defendant: Russell, Derek

Pay/Appear:

DOB:

09/11/1967 Officer:

Alan Rosenthal (367)

DL #:

C5969182

Citation Date: 12/02/2014 Address: 735 Pine St Santa Rosa, CA 95404

Appearances & Waivers

- Defendant Present

			Fines & Fed	es	
Cnt	Code	Plea	Disposition	Terms & Conditions	Pay
1	VC21453(a)	Not Guilty - Court Entered Plea			\$623.00
	<u> </u>			Total Fines and Fees:	\$623.00

Programs & Probation

Settings, Hearings, & Orders

- Other/Orders: RULING ON MOTION: COURT DENIES MOTIONS

Trials & Motions

- MOTION TO STRIKE, VERIFIED COMPLAINT, REMOVAL OF COURT ENTERED PLEA; COURT DENIES ORAL 170.6 TO THE COURT: **COURT DENIES AS UNTIMELY**

⁻ The COURT TRIAL DATE is 03/26/2015 and the COURT TRIAL TIME is 1.30 p.m.. This case has been set for Court Trial by order of the Court. The Defendant must appear at the Court Trial. Willful failure to appear may result in an additional Failure to Appear charge and an additional civil assessment fee.

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Superior Court of California, County of Sonoma

Traffic Division - Room 109-J

600 Administration Drive Santa Rosa, CA 95403-2878

TRAFFIC COURT MINUTES

Courtroom:

14

Date: 2/20/2015

Time:

10:30

Judicial Officer: WHEELDIN, ANTHONY

Interpreter:

Clerk:

Pat Graham

Language:

Case Information

Case #: SRO1418580

Defendant: Russell, Derek

Pay/Appear:

03/09/2015

DOB:

09/11/1967 Officer:

Alan Rosenthal (367)

DL #:

C5969182

Citation Date: 12/02/2014 Address: 735 Pine St Santa Rosa, CA 95404

Appearances & Waivers

- Defendant Present

Fines & Fees

Cnt	Code	Plea	Disposition	Terms & Conditions	Pay
1	VC21453(a)	Not Guilty - Court Trial			\$623.00
				Total Fines and Fees:	\$623.00

Programs & Probation

Settings, Hearings, & Orders

- The NEXT COURT DATE is 03/20/2015 and the COURT TIME is 10.30 a.m.. This case has been continued by order of the Court. The Defendant must appear at the next court date.

Willful failure to appear may result in an additional Failure to Appear charge and an additional civil assessment fee.

- The COURT TRIAL DATE is 03/26/2015 and the COURT TRIAL TIME is 1.30 p.m.. This case has been set for Court Trial by order of the Court. The Defendant must appear at the Court Trial.

Willful failure to appear may result in an additional Failure to Appear charge and an additional civil assessment fee.

- Other/Orders: RULING ON MOTION

Trials & Motions

- MOTION TO STRIKE, VERIFIED COMPLAINT, REMOVAL OF COURT ENTERED PLEA

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page6 of 47





Superior Court of California, County of Sonoma

Traffic Division - Room 109-J

600 Administration Drive Santa Rosa, CA 95403-2878

TRAFFIC COURT MINUTES

Courtroom:

Date: 2/18/2015

Time:

10:30

Judicial Officer:

WHEELDIN, ANTHONY

Interpreter:

Clerk:

Pat Graham

Language:

Case Information

Case #: SRO1418580

Defendant: Russell, Derek

Pay/Appear:

03/09/2015

DOB:

09/11/1967 Officer:

Alan Rosenthal (367)

DL #:

C5969182

Citation Date: 12/02/2014 Address: 735 Pine St Santa Rosa, CA 95404

Appearances & Waivers

- Defendant Present

- Court advises Defendant of constitutional and statutory rights.

- Defendant does not waive time for court trial and the trial will be heard within 45 days. 45th Day: 04/03/2015

			Fines & Fed	es	
Cnt	Code	Plea	Disposition	Terms & Conditions	Pay
1	VC21453(a)	Not Guilty - Court Trial			\$623.00
				Total Fines and Fees:	\$623.00

Programs & Probation

Settings, Hearings, & Orders

Willful failure to appear may result in an additional Failure to Appear charge and an additional civil assessment fee.

Willful failure to appear may result in an additional Failure to Appear charge and an additional civil assessment fee.

- Other/Orders: FOR FILING OF MOTION

⁻ The NEXT COURT DATE is 02/20/2015 and the COURT TIME is 10.30 a.m.. This case has been continued by order of the Court. The Defendant must appear at the next court date.

⁻ The COURT TRIAL DATE is 03/26/2015 and the COURT TRIAL TIME is 1.30 p.m.. This case has been set for Court Trial by order of the Court. The Defendant must appear at the Court Trial.

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page7 of 47 位置自写的对 " 2015 FEB 20 AM 9: 28 1 DEREK RUSSELL CO. D.A 2 735 Pine Street Santa Rosa, California [95404] 3 337-422-9200 In Pro Per 4 5 6 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 FOR THE COUNTY OF SONOMA 10 Case No.: SRO1418580 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 11 REMOVAL OF COURT ENTERED Plaintiff, PLEA of February 18, 2015 in Dept 14 12 by Judge Wheeldin per PC §1018 and 13 VS. enter of Demurrer per PC §1002-1008 DEREK RUSSELL, an individual, 14 **HEARING:** Date: February 20, 2015 15 Time: 10 am Defendant, Dept: 14 16 DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF SONOMA AND CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT. 17 18 On February 20, 2015, Derek Russell, Defendant in error, is moving to remove the court entered plea entered on February 18, 2015 by Judge Wheeldin in Dept 14, pursuant to PC §1018. 19 Defendant in Error never refused to plea, and the plea was entered erroneously by the Judge. 20 Derek Russell will also do so in open court orally at his next appearance. Defendant in Error 21 requires to demurrer per PC §1002-1012. This section shall be liberally construed to affect these 22 objects and to promote justice. 23 24 25 Dated: February 20, 2015 26 DEREK RUSSELL, In pro per 27 Without Prejudice UCC 1-308 28 Page 1 REMOVAL OF COURT ENTERED PLEA PC1018

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page8 of 47 RECEIV 2015 FEB 20 AM 9: 28 1 DEREK BUSSELL 735 Pine Street I'A CU. D.A. Santa Rosa, California [95404] 337-422-9200 3 In Pro Per 4 5 6 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 FOR THE COUNTY OF SONOMA 9 10)Case No.: SRO1418580 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 11 Plaintiff, Notice of Dispute, Demand for 12)Verification/Validation of Alleged vs. 13)Debt: DEREK RUSSELL, an individual, DATE: February 20, 2015 14 Defendant,)TIME: 10 am 15 16 DEPT: 14-TRAFFIC 17 18 19 I received the above citation and notice to appear from you that alleges your 20 position as a debt collector and appeared in court February 18, 2015. Accordingly, my 21 records reflect you are not, neither have you ever been a known creditor of mine, or one 22 23 that I have conducted any consumer transactions with. Therefore your identity is unknown 24 to me at this time, and you appear to not be a known party to any transaction that I recall. 25 26 This requires further information and documentation from you to verify your status and 27 28 **DEBT DISPUTE FDCPA 15 USC §1692g** Page 1

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capacity. Therefore I am respectfully demanding verification and or validation of any alleged debt pursuant to 15 USC§1692g, and California Rosenthal Act §1788 et seq respectively.

The California Highway Patrol and the Sonoma County Superior Court are "debt collector" pursuant to 15 USC§1692a(6), and California Rosenthal Act §1788. DEREK RUSSELL is a "consumer" as that term is defined in 15 USC§1692a(3). CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL AND THE SONOMA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, is not a *creditor*, and I have not applied for, neither received any services or credit with your particular agency.

In light of the foregoing please provide a certified true alleged original genuine executed contract/agreement that memorializes the transaction between you and I that supports you're your alleged debt. If your debt collection firm is unable to provide a sufficient legal basis for your demanding payment, I will bring suit against your agency for violations of federal and state consumer protection laws without further notice. Therefore this notice can be construed as a Notice of Intent to bring such action if your response does not support a legal/legitimate debt "owed" to your agency. In concluding, you are required to respond within five (5) business days to my requests, should you fail to timely respond, and or proffer a non- response, a suit will be filed in the appropriate court.

Dated: February 20, 2015

DEREK RUSSELL, In pro per Without Prejudice UCC 1-308

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page10 of 47

RECEIVE

2015 FEB 20 AM 9: 28

1 DEREK RUSSELLAUHA CO. U.A. 2 735 Pine Street

Santa Rosa, California [95404]

337-422-9200

VS.

In Pro Per

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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SONOMA

Case No.: SRO1418580 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA REQUEST FOR VERIFIED Plaintiff,

)COMPLAINT

PC 853.9, VC 40513 a&b, GC 100, 26500, 26501, 26502 DEREK RUSSELL, an individual, C.C.P. 446

Defendant,

Alleged Defendant herein, **DOES NOT PLEA**, and requests a verified complaint pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code 853.9 sub-paragraph (b), California Motor Vehicle Code 40513 (a) & (b), Government Code sections; 100, 26500, 26501 and 26502 respectively.

Government Code 26502 states: "The District attorney shall institute proceedings"

Defendant herein additionally request that said verified complaint be filed and signed by the people's representative in the above matter, (See: C.C.P. 446.) A California peace officer is not the people's representative as he or she is not licensed to practice law, nor, can he/she participate in discovery as the people's representative. Therefore, the signature on the "Notice to Appear" cannot constitute a verification nor constitute an accusatorial instrument within the due process requirements of the California Constitution of the 14th amendment to the United States constitution. Defendant herein demands due process and requests the court defend the

constitutionally protected rights of the accused.

Case 3:15-cv-01848-JST Document 1 Filed 04/24/15 Page 11 of 47

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page11 of 47 Dated: February 20, 2015 DEREK RUSSELL, In pro per Without Prejudice UCC 1-308 Page 2 REQUEST FOR VERIFIED COMPLAINT

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page12 of 47

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1	DEREK RUSSELL 2015	FEB 18 PM 1: 43
2	735 Pine Street	OHOMA CO. D.A.
3	337-422-9200	RECEIVE
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6		SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFOR: COUNTY OF SONOMA
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8	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE ST.	ATE OF CALIFORNIA
9	FOR THE COUNTY C	F SONOMA
10		. C N SD 01410590
11	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA)Case No.: SRO1418580
12	Plaintiff,	NOTICE AND MOTION TO STRIKE NOTICE TO APPEAR
13	VS.	
14	DEREK RUSSELL, an individual,	DATE: February 18, 2015
15	Defendant,	TIME: 8:30 am
16) DEPT: 14-TRAFFIC
17		_
18	NOTICE IS HEREBY CIVEN As a second size of discount	tioned above at the Symposium Count of
19	NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on date and time	
20	California, County of Sonoma, Defendant DEREK R	USSELL [hereinafter "Defendant"] will
21	Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Infraction on the following	g grounds:
22	1. The Infraction fails under the following Supre	me Court Cases:
23	 a. Right to Travel- Shapiro v. Thompson, 39 b. Standards for Police to Stop/Arrest- Brow 	
24	b. Standards for Police to Stop/Arrest- Brow c. Right to Protect Liberty- Murdock v. Peni	
25	d. Right to Ignore with Impunity_Schuttlesw	
26	e. Willfull Intent-Evil- U. S. v Bishop, 412 U	J. S. 346 (1973)
27	f. Waivers of Constitutional Rights - Brady	
28	g. Malice may be inferred-Pauley v. Hall 33	5 N. W. 2d 197, 124 Mich App 255
	NOTICE AND MOTION TO STRIKE NOTICE TO APP	EAR Page 1

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page13 of 47

ENDORSED FILED

FED 20 2015

DEREK RUSSELL 735 Pine Street Santa Rosa, California [95404] 337-422-9200 In Pro Per

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SONOMA

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SONOMA

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff,

vs.

DEREK RUSSELL, an individual,

Defendant,

Defendant,

Ocase No.: SRO1418580

NOTICE AND MOTION TO STRIKE NOTICE TO APPEAR

DATE: February 18, 2015

TIME: 8:30 am

DEPT: 14-TRAFFIC

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on date and time mentioned above at the Superior Court of

California, County of Sonoma, Defendant DEREK RUSSELL [hereinafter "Defendant"] will

Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Infraction on the following grounds:

- 1. The Infraction fails under the following Supreme Court Cases:
 - a. Right to Travel- Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
 - b. Standards for Police to Stop/Arrest- Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)
 - c. Right to Protect Liberty- Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)
 - d. Right to Ignore with Impunity-Schuttlesworth v Birmingham Alabama_373 us 262
 - e. Willfull Intent-Evil- *U. S. v Bishop*, 412 U. S. 346 (1973)
 - f. Waivers of Constitutional Rights Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748
 - g. Malice may be inferred-Pauley v. Hall 335 N. W. 2d 197, 124 Mich App 255

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- h. Malicious prosecution-Lopez v. Modisitt 488 F. Supp 119 D. C. 1980.
- i. Seizure be "reasonable." Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1;
- j. Seizure specific, ojective facts-United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873.
- k. Unlawful search and seizure-interpreted in favor of citizen-Scheuer v. Rhodes 416 U.S. 232, 1974, Expounds upon Owen Byers v. U.S. 273 U.S. 28
- Court protect encroachment of Constitutionally secured liberties Boyd v. U.S. 116
 U.S. 616
- m. Rights secured by Constitution-Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
- n. Law enforcement practice is judged-Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)
- o. Jurisdiction cannot be assumed Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 250
- p. No Immunity Officers of Law-Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980)
- q. Encroachment of rights-Bryars v United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927)
- r. Supreme Law of Land-Marbury v. Madison 5 US.
- s. Unconstitutional act is not law-Norton v. Shelby County 118 US 425
- t. Unconstitutional statute-16 Am Jur Vol. 2, sec 177, 256.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR PRO SE PLEADINGS

1. Defendant admits to some technical missteps attributable to the learning curve. However, none of which is fatal to his claim as will be demonstrated below. The Defendant is proceeding without the benefit of legal counsel. Additionally, I am not a practicing attorney nor have I been trained in the complex study of law. As such, Defendant's pro se papers are to be construed liberally. See *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519-20, (1972). "A pro se litigant should be given a reasonable opportunity to remedy defects in his pleadings if the factual allegations are close to stating a claim for relief." *Hall v. Bellmon*, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Accordingly such pleadings should be held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by licensed, practicing attorneys. B.Platsky v. CIA, 953 F.2d 25, 26 28 (2nd Cir. 1991), The Court is the Guardian of 'my' liberties and "Court errs if court dismisses pro se litigant without instruction of how pleadings are deficient and how to repair pleadings."

Dated: February 10, 2015.

DEREK RUSSELL

Defendant in Pro Per

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant was unlawfully pulled over on December 2, 2014 and issued a Notice to Appear. Defendant did not know nor understand the court, jurisdiction, charges, and the Police Officer failed to properly inform Defendant whereby any contract achieved is null and void. In this judicial realm, rights of man are paramount and Supreme Court Rulings are trump. Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748: "Waivers of Constitutional Rights, not only must they be voluntary, they must be knowingly intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness." "If men, through fear, fraud, or mistake, should in terms renounce or give up any natural right, the eternal law of reason and the grand end of society would absolutely vacate such renunciation. The right to freedom being a gift of ALMIGHTY GOD, it is not in the power of man to alienate this gift and voluntarily become a slave." —Samuel Adams, 1772

"A bill of attainder is defined to be 'a legislative Act which inflects punishment without judicial trial" "...where the legislative body exercises the office of judge, and assumes judicial magistracy, and pronounces on the guilt of a party without any of the forms or safeguards of a trial, and fixes the punishment."

The alleged determination of "commitment cost" and "Fine" for alleged traffic tickets or court costs, fees, or penalties requires execution as a "cloak to disguise a collateral undertaking" in U.S. Funds and is "malicious vexation by legal process" under the disguise/pretense of a "lawful" government to enforce the unwritten Master - Slave relationship.

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"Although probable cause may not be inferred from malice, malice may be inferred from lack of probable cause." Pauley v. Hall 335 N. W. 2d 197, 124 Mich App 255.

"Malice is a <u>state of mind</u> and an essential <u>element of action</u> for malicious prosecution and is to be found by jury from case, and want of probable cause is the other element of action for malicious prosecution which must be proved by plaintiff." <u>Lopez v. Modisitt</u> 488 F. Supp 119 D. C. 1980.

II. MY RIGHT TO TRAVEL

I have a God given right to travel freely, secured and protected by the Constitution. I have a right to travel freely and unencumbered, pursuant to *Shapiro v. Thompson*, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

III. IMPROPER STOP, SEARCH AND SEIZURE

I was illegally and improperly stopped, Standards for Police to Stop/Arrest- Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). The application of the Texas statute to detain appellant and require him to identify himself violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe that appellant was engaged or had engaged in criminal conduct. Detaining appellant to require him to identify himself constituted a seizure of his person subject to the requirement of the Fourth Amendment that the seizure be "reasonable." *Cf. Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U. S. 1; *United States v. Brignoni-Ponce*, 422 U. S. 873. The Fourth Amendment requires that such a seizure be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require such action, or that the seizure be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. *Scheuer v. Rhodes*, 416 U.S. 232, 1974:

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Expounds upon Owen Byers v. U.S., 273 U.S. 28 Unlawful search and seizure. Your rights must be interpreted in favor of the citizen.

Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616: "The court is to protect against any encroachment of Constitutionally secured liberties."

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436: "Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation, which would abrogate them."

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) Except where there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 440 U. S. 653-663. (a) Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief. The permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Pp. 440 U. S. 653-655.

IV. CAN A STATE CONVERT MY RIGHTS INTO A PRIVILAGE?

Can a state arbitrarily and erroneously convert MY right into a privilege and issue a license and a fee for it? Of course not. Murdock v. Penn., 319 US 105: "No state shall convert a liberty into a privilege, license it, and attach a fee to it."

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V. IF THE STATE DOES, I CAN ENGAGE IN THE RIGHT WITH IMPUNITY

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 373 US 262: "If the state converts a liberty into a privilege, the citizen can engage in the right with impunity." Shuttlesworth v Birm. Said that if the state does convert your right into a privilege and charge a license and a fee for it you can ignore the license and fee, and engage in the right with impunity. That means they can't punish me...they have to let me go.

I DID NOT HAVE WILFULL INTENT. MENS REA VI.

U. S. v Bishop, 412 U. S. 346 (1973)... Basically what Bishop does is it sets a standard for what constitutes a criminal violation in terms of willful intent. Willfulness is one of the elements which is required to be proven. In any criminal element you have to prove that 1. You are the party, 2. That you had a method or opportunity to do a thing, and 3. That you did so with a willful intent. Now, when we get to willful intent, willful is defined as an evil motive or intent to avoid a known duty or task under the law with immoral uncertainty. Obviously I have decided that I have relied on the United States Constitution, and I have relied on the decisions of the supreme court (THE OPINIONS OF THE NINE MEN IN THE BLACK ROBES-TRUMP). So could I have willfully done any deed or crime? Obviously not. So this case stipulates that I have a perfect defense for the element of willfulness. Since the burden on the prosecution is to prove that I did willfully and knowingly avoid a known duty or task under the law with immoral certainty he cannot perform that task, because I obviously have MY constitutional immunity to that. "If you've relied on prior decisions of the Supreme Court you have a perfect defense for willfulness." U.S. v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346

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VII. CONCLUSION

I have God given rights, secured and protected by the Constitution of the United States and the State of California. It's very important that you understand first, the constitution is the supreme law of the land and that I have that right, and that right shall not be infringed, and it's supposed to be enforced in favor of me, the clearly intended and expressly designated beneficiary. Since the burden on the prosecution is to prove that I did willfully and knowingly avoid a known duty or task under the law with immoral certainty he cannot perform that task, because I obviously have my constitutional immunity to that. The State cannot compel me to have a license or pay a fee for the exercise of your right. And if they do, I can ignore the license and engage the right with impunity. And since I have a perfect defense for the element of willfulness, the State cannot punish me. The Court should dismiss, as the People don't have a cause of action.

"Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided." Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 250.

"The law requires PROOF OF JURISDICTION to appear on the Record of the administrative agency and all administrative proceedings." *Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533 (1974)* "If any tribunal (court) finds absence of proof of jurisdiction over person and subject matter, the case must be dismissed." *Louisville RR v. Motley, 211 U.S. 149, 29 S Ct. 42 (1908)* "Where there is no jurisdiction there is no judge; the proceeding is as nothing. Such has been law from the days of the Marshalsea." *10 Coke 68; also Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335, 351. "Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F 2d 948.*

IX. NO IMMUNITY

Now that this Court is informed of the above rights and Supreme Court Opinions, if the Plaintiff continues, it does so at its own risk. You will not be able to say "Well, we acted in

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page20 of 47

good faith...We had good faith reliance that you broke the law...And that means you can't sue us. That's a lie. Since these two cases, *Owen v. City Of Independence*, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) and *Maine v Thiboutot*, 448 U.S.1 (1980).

Basically what these two cases say "Where plain language of a statute supported by consistent judicial interpretation is strong, it is not necessary to look beyond the words of the statute."

"The right of action created by statute relating to deprivation under color of state law of a right secured by the constitution and the laws of the United States encompasses claims which are solely based on statutory violations of federal law, and applied to the claim that claimants had been deprived of their rights in some capacity, to which they were entitled.

They claimed that they acted in "good faith". The Supreme Court said "You are deemed to be officers of the law; you are to advise us of the law; you can hardly claim that you in good faith for willful deprivation of the law, and you certainly can't claim ignorance of the law, because a citizen out here on the street can't claim ignorance of the law. It makes the law look stupid if an officer of the court or some officer of government doesn't know the law and then they go ahead and abuse somebody's constitutional rights."

So in matters of constitutional rights both these cases uphold one point: Whenever they violate your constitutional rights they do so at their own peril. It even says that at *Title 18 Sec* 241, 242. It says that upon conviction you are subject to a \$10,000 fine, 10 years in jail, or both, and if death results life in prison. They're telling you "Don't violate somebody's rights".

Title 42 USC sec. 1983, 1985, & 1986 clearly establish your right to sue anybody that does that. Now they're going to claim that you can't sue them, because they have judicial immunity. Well, guess what? These two cases remove judicial immunity. There is no judicial immunity for violating someone's rights.

Judge, you are deemed to know the law and swear to uphold it. You can hardly claim that you acted in good faith for willful deprivation of the law and you certainly can't claim ignorance of the law for that would make the law look stupid for a knowledgeable judge to claim ignorance of the law when a citizen on the street can't claim ignorance of the law.

Therefore there is no judicial immunity. These cases have been on the books since 1982.

CONSTRUED IN MY FAVOR

The next case I want to talk about is *Bryars v United States*, 273 U. S. 28 (1927). This is a search and seizure case which sets constitutional standards which Constitutional provisions for the security of a person and property are to be liberally construed, and it is the duty of the court to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachment therein.

The reality here is what they are setting is the standards must be liberally construed in favor of the citizen. It's the duty of the court to make sure that happens. So now, you have a right to be wrong, you have a right to enter your viable defenses that you honestly think, no state can turn that right into a privilege and issue a license and a fee, and if they do you can ignore the license and fee. They must prove the burden of proof of willfulness which they cannot do. If they do violate your rights you do have a right to sue them Owens v City of Independence and Maine v Thiboutot, They have to give every consideration to you, and that's the way it is.

The next case I want to talk about is **Boyd v United States**,116 US 616: The court is to protect against encroachment of constitutionality or security liberty. It is equivalent to a compulsory production of papers to make the non-production of them a confession of the allegations, which is pretended they will prove, and a lot of times that will happen in federal cases.

All laws which are repugnant to the constitution are null and void. *Marbury v. Madison* 5 US.

Where rights secured by the constitution are involved, there can be no rule or law making legislation which would abrogate abolish them. *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436.

An unconstitutional act is not law. It confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protections, it creates no office, it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed *Norton v Shelby County* 118 US 425.

The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute though having the form and name of law in in reality no law, but is totally void. 16 Am Jur Vol. 2, sec 177, 256.

VIII. PRAYER

- 1. Since the Plaintiff (THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA) does not have a cause of action for which relief can be granted, counsel (STATE PROSECUTOR) is specifically precluded from performing his major task, therefore your honor, would it please the court at this time I would motion most graciously for dismissal with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action for which relief may be granted by this honorable court,
- 2. I require this Court to STRIKE THE NOTICE TO APPEAR, all related fee's, and to notify the DMV of this and to dismiss any Warrant (if any). To not do so would cause Defendant unrecoverable harm, physical and emotional stress.
- 3. I require this Court to submit Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law if this NOTICE TO APPEAR is not stricken.

Case 3:15-cv-01848-JST Document 1 Filed 04/24/15 Page 23 of 47

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page24 of 47

ENDORSED 1 **DEREK RUSSELL** FEB 20 2015 2 735 Pine Street Santa Rosa, California [95404] SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 3 337-422-9200 COUNTY OF SONOMA In Pro Per 4 5 6 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 FOR THE COUNTY OF SONOMA 10 Case No.: SRO1418580 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 11 REQUEST FOR VERIFIED Plaintiff. 12)COMPLAINT VS. 13 PC 853.9, VC 40513 a&b, GC 100, 26500, 26501, 26502 DEREK RUSSELL, an individual, 14 C.C.P. 446 15 Defendant. 16 Alleged Defendant herein, **DOES NOT PLEA**, and requests a verified complaint pursuant to the 17 provisions of Penal Code 853.9 sub-paragraph (b), California Motor Vehicle Code 40513 (a) & 18 (b), Government Code sections; 100, 26500, 26501 and 26502 respectively. 19 Government Code 26502 states: "The District attorney shall institute proceedings" 20 Defendant herein additionally request that said verified complaint be filed and signed by the 21 people's representative in the above matter, (See: C.C.P. 446.) A California peace officer is not 22 the people's representative as he or she is not licensed to practice law, nor, can he/she participate 23 in discovery as the people's representative. Therefore, the signature on the "Notice to Appear" cannot constitute a verification nor constitute an accusatorial instrument within the due process 24 requirements of the California Constitution of the 14th amendment to the United States 25 constitution. Defendant herein demands due process and requests the court defend the 26 constitutionally protected rights of the accused. 27 28 REQUEST FOR VERIFIED COMPLAINT Page 1

	Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW	Document3	Filed03/24/15	Page25 of 47
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2	Dated: February 20, 2015			
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	REQUEST FOR VERIFIED COMPLAI	NT		Page 2
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Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page26 of 47





Superior Court of California, County of Sonoma

Traffic Division - Room 109-J

600 Administration Drive Santa Rosa, CA 95403-2878

TRAFFIC COURT MINUTES

Courtroom:

Date: 3/20/2015

Time:

10:30

Judicial Officer: WHEELDIN, ANTHONY

Interpreter:

Clerk:

Pat Graham

Language:

Case Information

Case #: CHP84976TQ

Defendant: Russell, Derek

Pay/Appear:

DOB:

09/11/1967 Officer:

Wayne Bernard (13838)

DL #:

C5969182

Citation Date: 09/24/2014 Address: 3580 Green Hill Dr

Santa Rosa, CA 95404

Appearances & Waivers

- Defendant Present

Fines	: &	Fe	65
1 1110	,		U J

Cnt	Code	Plea	Disposition	Terms & Conditions	Pay
1	VC21703	Not Guilty - Court Entered Plea			\$371.00
2	VC12951(a)	Not Guilty - Court Entered Plea			\$238.00
	I			Total Fines and Fees:	\$609.00

Programs & Probation

Settings, Hearings, & Orders

- The COURT TRIAL DATE is 03/26/2015 and the COURT TRIAL TIME is 1.30 p.m.. This case has been set for Court Trial by order of the Court. The Defendant must appear at the Court Trial.

Willful failure to appear may result in an additional Failure to Appear charge and an additional civil assessment fee.

- Other/Orders: RULING ON MOTIONS, COURT DENIES MOTIONS

Trials & Motions

- MOTION TO STRICK, REMOVAL OF COURT ENTERED PLEA, VERIFIED COMPLAINT: COURT DENIES MOTIONS: ORAL MOTION 170.6 TO THIS COURT; DOURT DENIES MOTION

Case4:15-cy-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page27 of 47





Superior Court of California, County of Sonoma

Traffic Division - Room 109-J

600 Administration Drive Santa Rosa, CA 95403-2878

TRAFFIC COURT MINUTES

Courtroom:

14

Date: 2/20/2015

Time:

10:30

Judicial Officer: WHEELDIN, ANTHONY

Interpreter:

Clerk:

Pat Graham

Language:

Case Information

Case #: CHP84976TQ

Defendant: Russell, Derek

Pay/Appear:

02/25/2015

DOB:

09/11/1967 Officer:

Wayne Bernard (13838)

DL #:

C5969182

Citation Date: 09/24/2014 Address: 3580 Green Hill Dr

Santa Rosa , CA 95404

Appearances & Waivers

- Defendant Present

			Fines & Fe	es	
Cnt	Code	Plea	Disposition	Terms & Conditions	Pay
1	VC21703	Not Guilty - Court Trial			\$371.00
2	VC12951(a)	Not Guilty - Court Trial			\$238.00
				Total Fines and Fees:	\$609.00

Programs & Probation

Settings, Hearings, & Orders

Willful failure to appear may result in an additional Failure to Appear charge and an additional civil assessment fee.

Willful failure to appear may result in an additional Failure to Appear charge and an additional civil assessment fee.

- Other/Orders: RULING ON MOTIONS

Trials & Motions

- MOTION TO STRICK, rEMOVAL OF COURT ENTERED PLEA, VERIFIED COMPLAINT

⁻ The NEXT COURT DATE is 03/20/2015 and the COURT TIME is 10.30 a.m.. This case has been continued by order of the Court. The Defendant must appear at the next court date.

⁻ The COURT TRIAL DATE is 03/26/2015 and the COURT TRIAL TIME is 1.30 p.m.. This case has been set for Court Trial by order of the Court. The Defendant must appear at the Court Trial.

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page28 of 47





Superior Court of California, County of Sonoma

Traffic Division - Room 109-J

600 Administration Drive Santa Rosa, CA 95403-2878

TRAFFIC COURT MINUTES

Courtroom:

14

Date: 2/18/2015

Time:

10:30

Judicial Officer: WHEELDIN, ANTHONY

Interpreter:

Clerk:

Pat Graham

Language:

Case Information

Case #: CHP84976TQ

Defendant: Russell, Derek

Pay/Appear:

02/25/2015

DOB:

09/11/1967 Officer:

Wayne Bernard (13838)

DL #:

C5969182

Citation Date: 09/24/2014 Address: 3580 Green Hill Dr

Santa Rosa, CA 95404

Appearances & Waivers

- Defendant Present

- Defendant does not waive time for court trial and the trial will be heard within 45 days. 45th Day: 04/03/2015

1 VC21703 Not Guilty - Court Trial	\$371.00
	\$371.00
2 VC12951(a)	\$238.00

Programs & Probation

Settings, Hearings, & Orders

Willful failure to appear may result in an additional Failure to Appear charge and an additional civil assessment fee.

Willful failure to appear may result in an additional Failure to Appear charge and an additional civil assessment fee.

- Other/Orders: FILING OF MOTION

⁻ The NEXT COURT DATE is 02/20/2015 and the COURT TIME is 10.30 a.m.. This case has been continued by order of the Court. The Defendant must appear at the next court date.

⁻ The COURT TRIAL DATE is 03/26/2015 and the COURT TRIAL TIME is 1.30 p.m.. This case has been set for Court Trial by order of the Court. The Defendant must appear at the Court Trial.

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page29 of 47

RECEIVE

2015 FEB 20 AM 9: 28

DEREK RUSSEELIGUTA CU. D.A. 735 Pine Street

Santa Rosa, California [95404]

337-422-9200

In Pro Per

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REQUEST FOR VERIFIED COMPLAINT

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SONOMA

Case No.: CHP84976TQ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA REQUEST FOR VERIFIED Plaintiff. COMPLAINT VS. PC 853.9, VC 40513 a&b, GC 100, 26500, 26501, 26502 DEREK RUSSELL, an individual, C.C.P. 446

Defendant.

Alleged Defendant herein, **DOES NOT PLEA**, and requests a verified complaint pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code 853.9 sub-paragraph (b), California Motor Vehicle Code 40513 (a) & (b), Government Code sections; 100, 26500, 26501 and 26502 respectively.

Government Code 26502 states: "The District attorney shall institute proceedings"

Defendant herein additionally request that said verified complaint be filed and signed by the people's representative in the above matter, (See: C.C.P. 446.) A California peace officer is not the people's representative as he or she is not licensed to practice law, nor, can he/she participate in discovery as the people's representative. Therefore, the signature on the "Notice to Appear" cannot constitute a verification nor constitute an accusatorial instrument within the due process requirements of the California Constitution of the 14th amendment to the United States constitution. Defendant herein demands due process and requests the court defend the constitutionally protected rights of the accused.

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page30 of 47 Dated: February 20, 2015 DEREK RUSSELL, In pro per Without Prejudice UCC 1-308 Page 2 REQUEST FOR VERIFIED COMPLAINT

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page31 of 47

RECEIV

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff,

DEREK RUSSELL, an individual,

Defendant,

2015 FEB 20 AM 9: 28
DEREK RUSSELL
735 Pine Street 2000 D.A.
Santa Rosa, California [95404]

337-422-9200 In Pro Per

vs.

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DEBT DISPUTE FDCPA 15 USC §1692g

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SONOMA

)Case No.: CHP84976TQ

Notice of Dispute, Demand for Verification/Validation of Alleged Debt;

)DATE: February 20, 2015))TIME: 10 am

Thvill. 10 am

DEPT: 14-TRAFFIC

I received the above citation and notice to appear from you that alleges your position as a debt collector and appeared in court February 18, 2015. Accordingly, my records reflect you are not, neither have you ever been a known *creditor* of mine, or one that I have conducted any consumer transactions with. Therefore your identity is unknown to me at this time, and you appear to not be a known party to any transaction that I recall. This requires further information and documentation from you to verify your status and

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page32 of 47

capacity. Therefore I am respectfully demanding verification and or validation of any alleged debt pursuant to 15 USC§1692g, and California Rosenthal Act §1788 *et seq* respectively.

The California Highway Patrol and the Sonoma County Superior Court are "debt collector" pursuant to 15 USC§1692a(6), and California Rosenthal Act §1788. DEREK RUSSELL is a "consumer" as that term is defined in 15 USC§1692a(3). CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL AND THE SONOMA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, is not a *creditor*, and I have not applied for, neither received any services or credit with your particular agency.

In light of the foregoing please provide a certified true alleged original genuine executed contract/agreement that memorializes the transaction between you and I that supports you're your alleged debt. If your debt collection firm is unable to provide a sufficient legal basis for your demanding payment, I will bring suit against your agency for violations of federal and state consumer protection laws without further notice. Therefore this notice can be construed as a Notice of Intent to bring such action if your response does not support a legal/legitimate debt "owed" to your agency. In concluding, you are required to respond within five (5) business days to my requests, should you fail to timely respond, and or proffer a non- response, a suit will be filed in the appropriate court.

Dated: February 20, 2015

DEREK RUSSELL, In pro per Without Prejudice UCC 1-308

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page33 of 47 RECEIVED 1 2015 FEB 18 PM 1:43 DEREK RUSSELL 2 735 Pine Street SONOMA CO. D.A. Santa Rosa, California [95404] RECEIVED 3 337-422-9200 In Pro Per 4 FEB 18 2015 5 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SONOMA 6 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 FOR THE COUNTY OF SONOMA 10 Case No.: CHP84976TQ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 11 NOTICE AND MOTION TO STRIKE Plaintiff, 12 NOTICE TO APPEAR VS. 13 DATE: February 18, 2015 DEREK RUSSELL, an individual, 14 TIME: 8:30 am 15 Defendant, 16 DEPT: 14-TRAFFIC 17 18 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on date and time mentioned above at the Superior Court of 19 California, County of Sonoma, Defendant DEREK RUSSELL [hereinafter "Defendant"] will 20 21 Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Infraction on the following grounds: 22 The Infraction fails under the following Supreme Court Cases: 1. Right to Travel-Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) 23 a. Standards for Police to Stop/Arrest- Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) b. 24 Right to Protect Liberty- Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) c. Right to Ignore with Impunity_Schuttlesworth v Birmingham Alabama_373 us 262 25 d. Willfull Intent-Evil- U. S. v Bishop, 412 U. S. 346 (1973) e. 26 Waivers of Constitutional Rights - Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748 f. 27 Malice may be inferred-Pauley v. Hall 335 N. W. 2d 197, 124 Mich App 255 g. 28 Page 1 NOTICE AND MOTION TO STRIKE NOTICE TO APPEAR

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page34 of 47 **ENDORSED** FILED FEB 2 0 2015 1 **DEREK RUSSELL** SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 2 735 Pine Street COUNTY OF SONOMA Santa Rosa, California [95404] 3 337-422-9200 In Pro Per 4 5 6 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 FOR THE COUNTY OF SONOMA 10 Case No.: CHP84976TQ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 11 REMOVAL OF COURT ENTERED PLEA of February 18, 2015 in Dept 14 Plaintiff, 12 by Judge Wheeldin per PC §1018 and VS. 13 enter of Demurrer per PC §1002-1008 DEREK RUSSELL, an individual, 14 **HEARING:** Date: February 20, 2015 15 Time: 10 am Defendant, Dept: 14 16 DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF SONOMA AND CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT. 17 18 On February 20, 2015, Derek Russell, Defendant in error, is moving to remove the court 19 entered plea entered on February 18, 2015 by Judge Wheeldin in Dept 14, pursuant to PC §1018. Defendant in Error never refused to plea, and the plea was entered erroneously by the Judge. 20 Derek Russell will also do so in open court orally at his next appearance. Defendant in Error 21 requires to demurrer per PC §1002-1012. This section shall be liberally construed to affect these 22 objects and to promote justice. 23 24 25 Dated: February 20, 2015 26 DEREK RUSSELL, In pro per 27 Without Prejudice UCC 1-308 28 REMOVAL OF COURT ENTERED PLEA PC1018 Page 1

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page35 of 47

ENDORSED FILED

FEB 20 2015

DEREK RUSSELL
735 Pine Street
Santa Rosa, California [95404]
337-422-9200
In Pro Per

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SONOMA

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SONOMA

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff,

vs.

DEREK RUSSELL, an individual,

Defendant,

Defendant,

) Case No.: CHP84976TQ

) NOTICE AND MOTION TO STRIKE
) NOTICE TO APPEAR
)
DATE: February 18, 2015
)
TIME: 8:30 am
)
DEPT: 14-TRAFFIC

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on date and time mentioned above at the Superior Court of

California, County of Sonoma, Defendant DEREK RUSSELL [hereinafter "Defendant"] will

Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Infraction on the following grounds:

- 1. The Infraction fails under the following Supreme Court Cases:
 - a. Right to Travel- Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
 - b. Standards for Police to Stop/Arrest- Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)
 - c. Right to Protect Liberty- Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)
 - d. Right to Ignore with Impunity_Schuttlesworth v Birmingham Alabama_373 us 262
 - e. Willfull Intent-Evil- *U. S. v Bishop*, 412 U. S. 346 (1973)
 - f. Waivers of Constitutional Rights Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748
 - g. Malice may be inferred-Pauley v. Hall 335 N. W. 2d 197, 124 Mich App 255

Case4:15-cy-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page36 of 47

- Malicious prosecution- Lopez v. Modisitt 488 F. Supp 119 D. C. 1980. h.
- Seizure be "reasonable." Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1; i.
- Seizure specific, ojective facts-United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873. j.
- Unlawful search and seizure-interpreted in favor of citizen-Scheuer v. Rhodes 416 k. U.S. 232, 1974, Expounds upon Owen Byers v. U.S. 273 U.S. 28
- Court protect encroachment of Constitutionally secured liberties Boyd v. U.S. 116 l. U.S. 616
- Rights secured by Constitution-Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 m.
- Law enforcement practice is judged-Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) n.
- Jurisdiction cannot be assumed Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 250 0.
- No Immunity Officers of Law-Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) p.
- Encroachment of rights-Bryars v United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) q.
- Supreme Law of Land-Marbury v. Madison 5 US. r.
- Unconstitutional act is not law-Norton v. Shelby County 118 US 425 s.
- Unconstitutional statute-16 Am Jur Vol. 2, sec 177, 256. t.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR PRO SE PLEADINGS

1. Defendant admits to some technical missteps attributable to the learning curve. However, none of which is fatal to his claim as will be demonstrated below. The Defendant is proceeding without the benefit of legal counsel. Additionally, I am not a practicing attorney nor have I been trained in the complex study of law. As such, Defendant's pro se papers are to be construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-20, (1972). "A pro se litigant should be given a reasonable opportunity to remedy defects in his pleadings if the factual allegations are close to stating a claim for relief." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Accordingly such pleadings should be held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by licensed, practicing attorneys. B.Platsky v. CIA, 953 F.2d 25, 26 28 (2nd Cir. 1991), The Court is the Guardian of 'my' liberties and "Court errs if court dismisses pro se litigant without instruction of how pleadings are deficient and how to repair pleadings."

Dated: February 10, 2015.

DEREK RUSSELL

Defendant in Pro Per

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant was unlawfully pulled over on September 24, 2014 and issued a Notice to Appear. Defendant did not know nor understand the court, jurisdiction, charges, and the Police Officer failed to properly inform Defendant whereby any contract achieved is null and void. In this judicial realm, rights of man are paramount and Supreme Court Rulings are trump. Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748: "Waivers of Constitutional Rights, not only must they be voluntary, they must be knowingly intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness." "If men, through fear, fraud, or mistake, should in terms renounce or give up any natural right, the eternal law of reason and the grand end of society would absolutely vacate such renunciation. The right to freedom being a gift of ALMIGHTY GOD, it is not in the power of man to alienate this gift and voluntarily become a slave." —Samuel Adams, 1772

"A bill of attainder is defined to be 'a legislative Act which inflects punishment without judicial trial" "...where the legislative body exercises the office of judge, and assumes judicial magistracy, and pronounces on the guilt of a party without any of the forms or safeguards of a trial, and fixes the punishment."

The alleged determination of "commitment cost" and "Fine" for alleged traffic tickets or court costs, fees, or penalties requires execution as a "cloak to disguise a collateral undertaking" in U.S. Funds and is "malicious vexation by legal process" under the disguise/pretense of a "lawful" government to enforce the unwritten Master - Slave relationship.

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page38 of 47

"Although probable cause may not be inferred from malice, malice may be inferred from lack of probable cause." Pauley v. Hall 335 N. W. 2d 197, 124 Mich App 255.

"Malice is a <u>state of mind</u> and an essential <u>element of action</u> for malicious prosecution and is to be found by jury from case, and want of probable cause is the other element of action for malicious prosecution which must be proved by plaintiff." <u>Lopez v. Modisitt</u> 488 F. Supp 119 D. C. 1980.

II. MY RIGHT TO TRAVEL

I have a God given right to travel freely, secured and protected by the Constitution. I have a right to travel freely and unencumbered, pursuant to *Shapiro v. Thompson*, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

III. IMPROPER STOP, SEARCH AND SEIZURE

I was illegally and improperly stopped, Standards for Police to Stop/Arrest- Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). The application of the Texas statute to detain appellant and require him to identify himself violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe that appellant was engaged or had engaged in criminal conduct. Detaining appellant to require him to identify himself constituted a seizure of his person subject to the requirement of the Fourth Amendment that the seizure be "reasonable." *Cf. Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U. S. 1; *United States v. Brignoni-Ponce*, 422 U. S. 873. The Fourth Amendment requires that such a seizure be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require such action, or that the seizure be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. *Scheuer v. Rhodes*, 416 U.S. 232, 1974:

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page39 of 47

Expounds upon Owen Byers v. U.S., 273 U.S. 28 Unlawful search and seizure. Your rights must

be interpreted in favor of the citizen.

Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616: "The court is to protect against any encroachment of Constitutionally secured liberties."

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436: "Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation, which would abrogate them."

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) Except where there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 440 U. S. 653-663. (a)

Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief. The permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Pp. 440 U. S. 653-655.

IV. CAN A STATE CONVERT MY RIGHTS INTO A PRIVILAGE?

Can a state arbitrarily and erroneously convert MY right into a privilege and issue a license and a fee for it? Of course not. Murdock v. Penn., 319 US 105: "No state shall convert a liberty into a privilege, license it, and attach a fee to it."

Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page40 of 47

V. IF THE STATE DOES, I CAN ENGAGE IN THE RIGHT WITH IMPUNITY

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 373 US 262: "If the state converts a liberty into a privilege, the citizen can engage in the right with impunity." Shuttlesworth v Birm. Said that if the state does convert your right into a privilege and charge a license and a fee for it you can ignore the license and fee, and engage in the right with impunity. That means they can't punish me...they have to let me go.

VI. I DID NOT HAVE WILFULL INTENT. MENS REA

W. S. v Bishop, 412 U. S. 346 (1973)...Basically what Bishop does is it sets a standard for what constitutes a criminal violation in terms of willful intent. Willfulness is one of the elements which is required to be proven. In any criminal element you have to prove that 1. You are the party, 2. That you had a method or opportunity to do a thing, and 3. That you did so with a willful intent. Now, when we get to willful intent, willful is defined as an evil motive or intent to avoid a known duty or task under the law with immoral uncertainty. Obviously I have decided that I have relied on the United States Constitution, and I have relied on the decisions of the supreme court (THE OPINIONS OF THE NINE MEN IN THE BLACK ROBES-TRUMP). So could I have willfully done any deed or crime? Obviously not. So this case stipulates that I have a perfect defense for the element of willfulness. Since the burden on the prosecution is to prove that I did willfully and knowingly avoid a known duty or task under the law with immoral certainty he cannot perform that task, because I obviously have MY constitutional immunity to that. "If you've relied on prior decisions of the Supreme Court you have a perfect defense for willfulness." U.S. v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346

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VII. CONCLUSION

I have God given rights, secured and protected by the Constitution of the United States and the State of California. It's very important that you understand first, the constitution is the supreme law of the land and that I have that right, and that right shall not be infringed, and it's supposed to be enforced in favor of me, the clearly intended and expressly designated beneficiary. Since the burden on the prosecution is to prove that I did willfully and knowingly avoid a known duty or task under the law with immoral certainty he cannot perform that task, because I obviously have my constitutional immunity to that. The State cannot compel me to have a license or pay a fee for the exercise of your right. And if they do, I can ignore the license and engage the right with impunity. And since I have a perfect defense for the element of willfulness, the State cannot punish me. The Court should dismiss, as the People don't have a cause of action.

"Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided." Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 250.

"The law requires PROOF OF JURISDICTION to appear on the Record of the administrative agency and all administrative proceedings." *Hagans v. Lavine*, 415 U.S. 533 (1974) "If any tribunal (court) finds absence of proof of jurisdiction over person and subject matter, the case must be dismissed." *Louisville RR v. Motley*, 211 U.S. 149, 29 S Ct. 42 (1908) "Where there is no jurisdiction there is no judge; the proceeding is as nothing. Such has been law from the days of the Marshalsea." 10 Coke 68; also Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335, 351. "Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F 2d 948.

IX. NO IMMUNITY

Now that this Court is informed of the above rights and Supreme Court Opinions, if the Plaintiff continues, it does so at its own risk. You will not be able to say "Well, we acted in

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good faith...We had good faith reliance that you broke the law...And that means you can't sue us. That's a lie. Since these two cases, *Owen v. City Of Independence*, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) and *Maine v Thiboutot*, 448 U.S.1 (1980).

Basically what these two cases say "Where plain language of a statute supported by consistent judicial interpretation is strong, it is not necessary to look beyond the words of the statute."

"The right of action created by statute relating to deprivation under color of state law of a right secured by the constitution and the laws of the United States encompasses claims which are solely based on statutory violations of federal law, and applied to the claim that claimants had been deprived of their rights in some capacity, to which they were entitled.

They claimed that they acted in "good faith". The Supreme Court said "You are deemed to be officers of the law; you are to advise us of the law; you can hardly claim that you in good faith for willful deprivation of the law, and you certainly can't claim ignorance of the law, because a citizen out here on the street can't claim ignorance of the law. It makes the law look stupid if an officer of the court or some officer of government doesn't know the law and then they go ahead and abuse somebody's constitutional rights."

So in matters of constitutional rights both these cases uphold one point: Whenever they violate your constitutional rights they do so at their own peril. It even says that at *Title 18 Sec* 241, 242. It says that upon conviction you are subject to a \$10,000 fine, 10 years in jail, or both, and if death results life in prison. They're telling you "Don't violate somebody's rights".

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Title 42 USC sec. 1983, 1985, & 1986 clearly establish your right to sue anybody that does that. Now they're going to claim that you can't sue them, because they have judicial immunity. Well, guess what? These two cases remove judicial immunity. There is no judicial immunity for violating someone's rights.

Judge, you are deemed to know the law and swear to uphold it. You can hardly claim that you acted in good faith for willful deprivation of the law and you certainly can't claim ignorance of the law for that would make the law look stupid for a knowledgeable judge to claim ignorance of the law when a citizen on the street can't claim ignorance of the law.

Therefore there is no judicial immunity. These cases have been on the books since 1982.

CONSTRUED IN MY FAVOR

The next case I want to talk about is *Bryars v United States*, 273 U. S. 28 (1927). This is a search and seizure case which sets constitutional standards which Constitutional provisions for the security of a person and property are to be liberally construed, and it is the duty of the court to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachment therein.

The reality here is what they are setting is the standards must be liberally construed in favor of the citizen. It's the duty of the court to make sure that happens. So now, you have a right to be wrong, you have a right to enter your viable defenses that you honestly think, no state can turn that right into a privilege and issue a license and a fee, and if they do you can ignore the license and fee. They must prove the burden of proof of willfulness which they cannot do. If they do violate your rights you do have a right to sue them Owens v City of Independence and Maine v Thiboutot, They have to give every consideration to you, and that's the way it is.

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The next case I want to talk about is **Boyd v United States**,116 US 616: The court is to protect against encroachment of constitutionality or security liberty. It is equivalent to a compulsory production of papers to make the non-production of them a confession of the allegations, which is pretended they will prove, and a lot of times that will happen in federal cases.

All laws which are repugnant to the constitution are null and void. *Marbury v. Madison* 5 US.

Where rights secured by the constitution are involved, there can be no rule or law making legislation which would abrogate abolish them. *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436.

An unconstitutional act is not law. It confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protections, it creates no office, it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed *Norton v Shelby County* 118 US 425.

The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute though having the form and name of law in in reality no law, but is totally void. 16 Am Jur Vol. 2, sec 177, 256.

VIII. PRAYER

- 1. Since the Plaintiff (THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA) does not have a cause of action for which relief can be granted, counsel (STATE PROSECUTOR) is specifically precluded from performing his major task, therefore your honor, would it please the court at this time I would motion most graciously for dismissal with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action for which relief may be granted by this honorable court,
- 2. I require this Court to STRIKE THE NOTICE TO APPEAR, all related fee's, and to notify the DMV of this and to dismiss any Warrant (if any). To not do so would cause Defendant unrecoverable harm, physical and emotional stress.
- 3. I require this Court to submit Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law if this NOTICE TO APPEAR is not stricken.

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Dated: February 10, 2015

DEREK RUSSELL, In pro per Without Prejudice UCC 1-308

NOTICE AND MOTION TO STRIKE NOTICE TO APPEAR

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Case4:15-cv-01355-KAW Document3 Filed03/24/15 Page46 of 47 ENDORSED FEB 2 0 2015 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA **COUNTY OF SONOMA** 1 **DEREK RUSSELL** 735 Pine Street 2 Santa Rosa, California [95404] 337-422-9200 3 In Pro Per 4 5 6 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 FOR THE COUNTY OF SONOMA 9 10)Case No.: CHP84976TQ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 11 Plaintiff, Notice of Dispute, Demand for 12)Verification/Validation of Alleged vs. 13)Debt: DATE: February 20, 2015 DEREK RUSSELL, an individual, 14 Defendant, TIME: 10 am 15 16 DEPT: 14-TRAFFIC 17 18 I received the above citation and notice to appear from you that alleges your 19 20 position as a debt collector and appeared in court February 18, 2015. Accordingly, my 21 records reflect you are not, neither have you ever been a known creditor of mine, or one 22 23 that I have conducted any consumer transactions with. Therefore your identity is unknown 24 to me at this time, and you appear to not be a known party to any transaction that I recall. 25 26 This requires further information and documentation from you to verify your status and 27 28 Page 1 **DEBT DISPUTE FDCPA 15 USC §1692g**

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capacity. Therefore I am respectfully demanding verification and or validation of any alleged debt pursuant to 15 USC§1692g, and California Rosenthal Act §1788 et seq respectively.

The California Highway Patrol and the Sonoma County Superior Court are "debt collector" pursuant to 15 USC§1692a(6), and California Rosenthal Act §1788. DEREK RUSSELL is a "consumer" as that term is defined in 15 USC§1692a(3). CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL AND THE SONOMA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, is not a *creditor*, and I have not applied for, neither received any services or credit with your particular agency.

In light of the foregoing please provide a certified true alleged original genuine executed contract/agreement that memorializes the transaction between you and I that supports you're your alleged debt. If your debt collection firm is unable to provide a sufficient legal basis for your demanding payment, I will bring suit against your agency for violations of federal and state consumer protection laws without further notice. Therefore this notice can be construed as a Notice of Intent to bring such action if your response does not support a legal/legitimate debt "owed" to your agency. In concluding, you are required to respond within five (5) business days to my requests, should you fail to timely respond, and or proffer a non-response, a suit will be filed in the appropriate court.

Dated: February 20, 2015

DEREK RUSSELL. In pro per Without Prejudice UCC 1-308